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Introduction
Autism has gone from being largely unknown a few decades ago to become influential in modern 
United States and British culture. Both Steve Silberman's Neurotribes (2015) and John Donvan & 
Karen Zucker's In A Different Key (2016) chart the history of autism, from early conceptions to the 
present-day's integration of autism within modern culture. Both consider this integration as largely a 
positive force for autistic people, especially in comparison to approaches of earlier decades. The books 
cover some similar content, both describing initial 1940s notions, development of psychoanalysis and 
mother blaming, pharamacological treatments, behaviourist treatments, parent movements, educational 
tools, 1980s notions of an autistic spectrum, scares over vaccinations and the neurodiversity movement.
 Recent media reviews of these books have been generally positive and although I highlight the 
positive elements, my primary focus is on some of the significant problems in these books. Both books 
have made some historical errors but they seem more problematic in Silberman’s case. Donvan & 
Zucker largely stick to describing a series of events whereas Silberman weaves specific events into a 
wider narrative, one which treats the modern classification of autism as correct scientific fact. The only 
evidence present in Neurotribes for this approach is implicit in Silberman's history: the classification of
autism employed historically used to be deeply flawed so therefore our modern notion is good. I will 
highlight problematic historical assertions both books make but largely focus upon showing how those 
errors undermine Silberman's narrative. This critique gives more credibility to the alternative 
conceptions of autism he largely dismisses.  
As an individual diagnosed as autistic I believe the degree to which I should allow modern 
notions of autism to influence my self-perception, my identity and any support I receive should 
partially depend upon the epistemic worth of the modern concept. The history of autism certainly has 
potential use here, a source of alternative conceptualizations and approaches to compare modern autism
with. Silberman believes modern autism compares well, a claim which could influence the perceptions 
of autistic individuals, scientists and our wider culture towards modern autism. Whilst I believe modern
autism has some significant epistemic worth I also accept the possibility that some classifications from 
earlier decades could have even higher epistemic worth. They need balanced historical investigation 
rather than Silberman's unfair dismissal. 
Silberman's Narrative
Silberman in Neurotribes asserts that “nearly eighty years after the discovery of the autistic continuum 
by Asperger's team at the Heilpädogogik Station, its full breadth was finally reflected” in the DSM 
[Diagnostic Statistical Manual], referring to changes to the criteria for autism brought about by the 
2013 DSM-5 (p.503). This statement encapsulates Silberman's narrative: that the autistic spectrum was 
discovered in the 1940s but then forgotten, and was only reintroduced in the mid-1980's and fully 
implemented with DSM-5 in 2013. Silberman primarily blames the Austrian-born, Baltimore-based, 
child psychiatry pioneer Leo Kanner for the decades-long delay in adopting the autistic spectrum, 
writing that “the adoption of the spectrum model of autism by the psychiatric establishment in the 
1980s represented a decisive defeat for the father of the diagnosis” (pp.43-44).
Leo Kanner was a major figure in American child psychiatry from the 1930s to the 1970s, 
managing the first American child psychiatric clinic and publishing the first English language textbook 
on child psychiatry. In 1943 he published a paper describing a condition that he believed differed 
“markedly and uniquely from anything reported so far” in children he considered to exhibit “an 
extreme autistic aloneness, that, whenever possible, disregards, ignores, shuts out anything that comes 
to the child from the outside” (Kanner, 1943, p. 217; p.242, emphasis in original). While it is not 
completely unrelated, historical scholarship generally agrees that Kanner's autism describes a much 
more specific symptom pattern than modern autism (Evans, 2013, p.23; Eyal et al, 2010, p.130; 
Jacobsen, 2010, p.438; Verheoff, 2013, p.452). Silberman writes that “[f]or decades, Kanner 
maintained that his syndrome was monolithic by definition, limited to childhood, and vanishingly rare” 
(p.44). Silberman claims this notion of autism “prevailed for half a century, virtually unquestioned by 
clinicians”  but by the 1987 DSM-III-R “autism had been transformed into something that Kanner 
would have barely recognised” (p.151;424). 
Donvan & Zucker also contrast Kanner's autism with the 1980s spectrum, citing the leading 
autism researcher Lorna Wing who thought that 
“the condition had been too tightly inscribed. It was time to move beyond seeing 
autistic traits as meaningful only when they were locked together into a supposedly 
tight syndrome, as Kanner had done” (p.311). 
Unlike Silberman, they are less specific about what Kanner's autism entailed and do not blame him for 
the delayed adoption of a spectrum. 
Silberman contrasts Kanner's autism with the Austrian pediatrician Hans Asperger's discovery 
of the autistic spectrum in the 1940s (see Asperger (1944)). Although Asperger's work was largely 
unknown to the English speaking world until the 1980s, there is an ongoing debate over whether 
Kanner knew of Asperger's work and plagiarised it (see Chown, 2012, p.2264; Fellowes, 2015, p.2275; 
Lyons & Fitzgerald, 2007, p.2022; Olmsted & Blaxhill, 2015, p.340). Silberman's evidence is the 
strongest yet provided that Kanner possibly knew of Asperger's work. Among the fellow Jewish 
refugees Kanner helped emigrate from 1930's Europe was George Frankl, Asperger's chief 
diagnostician, whom Kanner would later work with. However, Silberman suggests Kanner disregarded 
rather than plagiarised Asperger's notions. Frankl shared Asperger's notions of a spectrum that 
“stretched from children with profound intellectual disability to “astonishing” child 
prodigies. But [argues Silberman] his inclusive conception of autism was to be doomed 
to obscurity by the man [Kanner] who had saved his life from the gas chamber” 
(pp.199-200).
Silberman's narrative sees the autistic spectrum as a fact that was discovered in the 1940s, 
forgotten about because Kanner's narrower definition was adopted, but then reimplemented by the 
1980s autistic spectrum.
Historical issues
 Although Silberman's claims that Kanner's autism was “monolithic by definition, limited to childhood, 
and vanishingly rare” (p.44) and was “virtually unquestioned by clinicians” (p.151), both his book and 
In a Different Key actually implicitly suggest it was largely unused.
“[Kanner] was sitting at the apex of a pyramid designed to filter all but the most 
profoundly disabled children of the most well-connected families in America out... The 
milder cases among the two hundred children seen by Asperger in Vienna would likely 
have never made it to the top of his pyramid” (pp.207-208; also Donvan & Zucker, 
p.89). 
If Kanner's autism was only rarely diagnosed then what happened to children with less rare, less 
monolithic and less severe symptoms? This question is not explicitly addressed and posing it makes 
Silberman's narrative difficult to follow.
First, autism was often diagnosed on criteria other than those established by Kanner, who in fact
had noted that “in some quarters to [there is] a dilution of the concept of early infantile autism, and the 
diagnosis has been made much too prodigiously” (Kanner, 1958, p.110). Silberman notes that Kanner 
stated he “turned away nine out of ten children referred to his office as “autistic” by other clinicians 
without an autism diagnosis” (pp.238-239; also Donvan & Zucker, p.279). Thus Kanner was one of the 
few child psychiatrists employing his narrow notion of autism but there were also alternative notions 
being employed. Neither Silberman nor Donvan & Zucker outline these non-Kanner notions of autism, 
leaving it unclear if they were less rare, less monolithic or resembled a spectrum. These are possibilities
given that Kanner felt “his whole concept was being watered down” (Donvan & Zucker, p.279), 
leaving the lack of investigation into non-Kanner notions of autism a significant omission for 
Silberman's argument.
Second, despite his claim that spectra only became employed in the mid-1980s, Silberman 
describes a diagnosis employed between the 1930s to 1970s, childhood schizophrenia, as a spectrum: 
“the childhood schizophrenia “spectrum” was much more inclusive than Kanner's 
conception of his syndrome, children who displayed many traits now considered classic 
signs of autism but showed no delay in acquiring language often ended up with that 
diagnosis” (p.226). 
Silberman puts “spectrum” in scare quotes, making it unclear whether he thinks childhood 
schizophrenia was or was not a spectrum. He provides no explicit answer and his other claims also 
leave this issue obscure. For instance, he mentions the work Lauretta Bender who described 
“a number of behaviours that are now considered classic signs of autism... her accounts 
of childhood schizophrenia were closer to Asperger's and Frankl's description of autistic
psychopathy than Kanner's constricted view of his syndrome” (p.210).1
If childhood schizophrenia was a spectrum, however, then how was the 1980s autistic spectrum new 
and how could Kanner be blamed for its earlier non-adoption? Since childhood schizophrenia was 
diagnosed and written about much more than autism (Donvan & Zucker p.365; Eyal et al, 2010, p.128; 
Silverman, 2012, pp.39-40), Silberman’s lack of clarity over whether childhood schizophrenia was a 
spectrum is a significant omission.
Silberman further complicates his argument by describing how Kanner's views changed. Kanner
initially considered autism separate from childhood schizophrenia but 
“saw the writing on the wall early on. While continuing to insist that his syndrome was 
a condition sui generis, he quietly folded it into the schizophrenia section... [then] 
officially waved the white flag [in 1949]” (p.211). 
Similarly, Donvan & Zucker write that “Kanner began to waver in his convictions about the 
significance of his own findings. He even revised his textbook during this period [1948], moving 
infantile autism to the schizophrenia category” (p.89). This shift occurred before 1950 and before much
had been published on autism (Silberman, p.210). Thus it is unclear how Kanner's initial 1943 stance 
could have prevented a spectrum arising for three decades. Alternatively, might Kanner's 1948 onwards
approach have prevented a spectrum arising? According to Silberman, 
Kanner attempted to negotiate a truce with [childhood schizophrenia] researchers... if 
they would let him have his rare, narrowly defined syndrome, he would yield the rest 
of Szurek’s “spectrum” to the ever-expanding field of childhood schizophrenia” 
(p.212).2
This analysis suggests that, to whatever degree childhood schizophrenia was a spectrum, Kanner's 
autism was not part of it. Yet, by 1958 Kanner was of the opinion that
“[t]he various forms of childhood schizophrenia share with early infantile autism the 
loss of effective contact and autistic thinking... Communication and affective 
perceptions are not usually as deeply disturbed as in autistic children. In the broader 
schizophrenic group there may also be a wider variety of symptoms” (Kanner & 
Lesser, 1958, p.728).
To the degree that spectrum entail similarities of symptoms but variations in severity then Kanner's 
position is closer to a spectrum than Silberman states, seeing autism as a more severe form of 
childhood schizophrenia which exhibits similar but less severe symptoms. 
Silberman admits that Kanner eventually changed his mind about notions of a spectrum 
because “dramatic differences in the life courses of his patients finally led Kannerhim to question his 
belief that is syndrome was narrowly defined and monolithic” (p. 237). He dates Kanner’s shift to the 
1970s, citing a 1971 publication where Kanner claimed “It is well known in medicine that any illness 
may appear in different degrees of severity, all the way from the so-called forme fruste to the most 
fulminant manifestation' (Kanner, 1971, as quoted by Silberman, p.237). But a look at Kanner’s 
writings suggests he had begun to move toward a spectrum position much earlier. For instance, already
in the 1950s he had noted “differences in the intensity of autistic aloneness and fragmentation” 
1 Lauretta Bender (1897-1987) was a New York based child psychiatrist and the leading childhood schizophrenia 
researcher.
2 Stanislaus Andrew Szurek was a San Francisco based Czech child psychiatrist who researched childhood schizophrenia.
(Kanner & Eisenberg, 1955, p.232) and “degree[s] of autistic isolation” (Kanner & Lesser, 1958, 
p.726).
Silberman also criticises Kanner's autism for being restricted to children. Silberman's concern 
would have force if there were no suitable diagnosis for adults; if Kanner had not discussed autistic 
adults; or if Kanner objected to post-childhood autism diagnosis. Unfortunately, Silberman does not 
discuss what diagnoses were employed for adults, making it unclear what diagnoses were available for 
individuals whose symptoms only became noticed in adulthood. Furthermore, Kanner wrote a 
commentary for a 1951 article which described “one autistic child who has reached adulthood. The two
decades before us ought to tell much about the destiny of those [autistic children] now observed and 
various treated” (Kanner in Darr & Worden, 1951, p.570). Here Kanner recognised autistic children can
exhibit autistic symptoms as adults whilst showing a wise caution about what autistic adults will be 
like. Significantly, the woman in that 1951 article was twenty-two years old at the time of Kanner's 
initial 1943 autism publication and yet he considered her autistic, which tells us that he considered 
diagnosing adults (who were undiagnosed as children) with autism as legitimate. Silberman is mistaken
to claim Kanner thought autism was restricted children. 
Silberman's evidence does not support Kanner's autism as monolithic and restricted to children 
whilst he is correct that Kanner's autism was extremely rare, his interpretation needs to be understood 
in the context of it being a subtype of the less rare childhood schizophrenia. 
Philosophical issues
In proclaiming the “discovery” of an autistic spectrum (p.503), Silberman's narrative implicitly treats 
the autistic spectrum as a fact waiting to be discovered. This approach is potentially problematic. Is the 
autistic spectrum something which exists factually independent of our beliefs or is it a methodological 
convention adopted to classify individuals with some similarities of symptoms? Silberman does not 
explicitly address these issues but uncritically seems to take the former approach. Whilst not untenable,
that approach is less popular among philosophers of psychiatry and therefore more controversial (see 
Cooper, 2007, p.46; Murphy 2006, p.316; Zachar 2014, p.154). Even if we accept the factual approach, 
Silberman offers no evidence that the facts entail the autistic spectrum rather than an alternative such as
a multiple demarcated diagnosis. Donvan & Zucker seem to implicitly alternate between each 
approach, sometimes closer to spectrum as fact and sometimes closer to spectrum as convention 
(compare for example Donvan & Zucker, 2016, p. 426 with p.367). Some recent commentators have 
argued modern autism is flawed because of the highly diverse causal basis (Cushing, 2013, p.38; 
Timimi et al, 2011, p.7). Silberman mentions the highly diverse causal basis (p.14) and suggests autism
is not a unified condition (p.510). Without addressing whether these issues supports a spectrum or an 
alternative Silberman and to a lesser degree, Donvan & Zucker should have remained more non-
committal rather than present the autistic spectrum as fact. 
Silberman also unfairly favours a particular notion of spectrum. One can simply employ a 
spectrum or one can include subtypes within a spectrum. Subtypes advantageously allow greater 
specificity of symptom descriptions but disadvantageously there is usually no obvious or unproblematic
way of placing the boundaries of subtypes. Silberman actually engages in these debates but only when 
it comes to childhood schizophrenia, not mentioning the possibility of subtyping modern autism. He 
simultaneously criticises childhood schizophrenia as too broad (p.211) whilst criticizing an early 
subdivision of childhood schizophrenia as being “prefabricated pigeonholes” (p.187). Which is worse, 
being too broad or employing arbitrary subtypes? Silberman does not address this question but the man 
he primarily criticizes did. Kanner argued childhood schizophrenia was too broad (1953, p.528) and 
considered autism as one of three subtypes of childhood schizophrenia (Kanner, 1969, p.3). Silberman 
actually praises Kanner's 1943 paper as “a paragon of clinical clarity... he lifted the gestalt of the 
syndrome... made it visible as a diagnostic entity apart from the undifferentiated mass of “pre-
psychotic” children” (p.194). This accurate claim sits uneasily, however, with Silberman's regular 
complaint that Kanner's autism was too narrow. Plausibly, a narrow definition was a worthwhile trade-
off to provide the very nebulous childhood schizophrenia with a more precise subtype. At minimum, 
Kanner's approach was a legitimate option rather than uncontroversially mistaken. If this is true of 
childhood schizophrenia then it is largely true of modern autism also. Though less broad than 
childhood schizophrenia was, significant variations in clinical picture means subtyping modern autism 
cannot be dismissed. Without first providing arguments for a non-subtyped spectrum Silberman should 
be more open to non-subtyped DSM-5 autism being inferior to a subtype approach (such as Kanner's 
precise subtypes or DSM-IV's less precise subtypes). 
Uncritically endorsing DSM-5 autistic spectrum as something to be discovered gives Silberman 
a standard to assess history – past child psychiatrists are praised for being closer to a non-subtyped 
spectrum and criticized for being further away. If a non-spectrum approach or a subtyped spectrum 
approach is superior to DSM-5 then Silberman's standards for assessing history is flawed. Kanner may 
thus not deserve Silberman's criticism. 
Treatment and neurodiversity
The strongest feature of both Silberman's and Donvan & Zucker's books is their coverage of the more 
recent history of autism research. Their histories of the period following the1960s are less problematic 
and make more novel contributions. Whereas earlier history of autism books by Nadesan (2005), 
Feinstein (2010), Eyal et al (2010) and Silverman (2012) cover development of educational 
technologies, parents movements, scares over vaccinations and neurodiversity, the books reviewed in 
this essay provide more detail on specific figures, their specific actions and their specific disputes with 
other historical figures. Silberman's and Donvan & Zucker's books are to be recommended to historians
dealing with such issues.
Silberman also makes another unsupported claim, based on his belief that the adoption of a 
spectrum substantially improved conditions for autistic individuals. 
“By overturning  his [Kanner's] conception of autism as a rare, inevitably devastating 
and homogeneous disorder, [Lorna Wing] made it possible for tens of thousands of 
children, teenagers, and adults to gain access to the educational placements and social 
services they deserved” (p.44). 
 
Silberman links this lack of support with autism being too narrowly conceived before the 1980s. 
However, Silberman's history does not cover pre-1980s diagnosis for adults or pre-1980s services 
available for individuals only diagnosed as adults. Without addressing these issues Silberman cannot 
support claims that implementing the 1980s autistic spectrum lead to increased access to services. More
fundamentally, there appears no obvious connection between diagnosis employed and support 
provided. Imagine that Kanner's 1943 paper actually listed DSM-5 diagnostic criteria and these were 
immediately given widespread employment whilst childhood schizophrenia was immediately 
abandoned. Are we to presume that the positive elements associated with a diagnosis today would also 
have been present throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s? Alternatively, imagine if pre-1980s notions 
of childhood schizophrenia had been retained by post-1980 editions of the DSM whilst autism 
remained as Kanner's narrow notion. Does this mean that none of the positive elements of being 
diagnosed with modern autism would have become associated with a post 1980s childhood 
schizophrenia? Plausibly treatment and services are influenced by many more factors than the 
diagnosis employed, such as the disability rights movement and increasing community care. Silberman 
needs to offer stronger evidence to claim Kanner's notion of autism prevented many individuals 
receiving helpful support. Donvan & Zucker make similar omissions, though only over who was 
diagnosed rather than support given. Without a 
“big, wide, deep and blurry spectrum... it seems unlikely that the notion of autism Leo 
Kanner coined in 1943 could legitimately be stretched to include large numbers of 
people as intelligent, talented, and independent” (p.519). 
Aupporting this claim requires evidence thatg childhood schizophrenia or adult diagnosis could not 
have also diagnosed successful higher functioning individuals but neither book explores these issues. 
Whilst Silberman and Donvan & Zucker are correct in claiming that autism as a potentially 
positive thing is a relatively new idea, the notion was not completely absent in Kanner's later thoughts. 
In 1973 he wrote that some autistic individuals 
“received-and enjoyed-the recognition earned by the detailed knowledge they had 
stored up years of obsessive rumination of specific topics... Rewards came to them 
also from their employers who... remarked on their meticulousness and 
trustworthiness. Life among people thus lost its former menacing aspects. Nobody 
has shoved them forcibly through a gate which others had tried to unlock for them; it 
was they who, at first timidly and experimentally, then more resolutely, paved their 
way to it and walked through” (Kanner, 1973, p.221 emphasis original)
Thus, Kanner recognised autism need not be truly disabling or without benefits and that autistic 
individuals could play a role in improving their own lives. 
Conclusion
Since its publication Neurotribes has become enormously influential within online, written and media 
discussions in various forums about what autism is and how society should approach it, more so than  
any other historically focused text on the subject. This makes Neurotribes important to me since, for an 
autistic individual such as myself, modern approaches to autism have the potential to influence my self-
perception, my identity and any support I receive. Despite my heavy criticism of Neurotribes I largely 
share its positive message. I immensely benefited immensely by being diagnosed and I believe this is 
partly because modern autism has significant scientific worth, getting something right about reality. 
Despite this, Neurotribes has significant potential for harm. I believe modern autism is making positive 
contribution but a rich variety of substantive sub-types of autism might get something even more right 
about reality and thus make an even greater contribution to the self-perception, identity and support 
provided to those currently diagnosed with autism.
Silberman’s narrative is potentially harmful because it so heavily favours modern autism with 
its non-subtyped spectrum over alternative pre-1980s type approaches without acknowledging the 
legitimacy of alternatives to non-subtyped spectrums. Additionally, the evidence Silberman employs in 
favour of non-subtyped spectrums is flawed. Those writing history always risk putting the present into 
historical writing and Silberman falls into this trap. The main evidence provided to support modern 
autism is criticism of pre-1980s diagnosis. However, criticism of pre-1980s approaches is partially 
based in assuming modern autism is correct. This circular argument (further compounded by some 
historical errors) illegitimately supports modern autism. Undeniably, the many positive benefits 
associated with being diagnosed as autistic today are preferable to motherblaming psychoanalysis, 
experimental drugs and asylum places associated with the pre-1980s. However, these issues are only 
distantly connected to which diagnoses are employed. They could have occurred alongside many 
different approaches to diagnosis yet Silberman entirely favours a non-subtyped spectrum. All this is 
especially concerning because Silbermans asks relevant critical questions of childhood schizophrenia, 
considering it too broad whilst considering its subtypes as arbitrary, yet does not ask similar questions 
of modern autism. Seeing how non-spectrum and subtyped spectrums worked historically is an 
important source of information provided they are interpreted from a standpoint other than assuming 
modern autism is unambigiously correct. Whilst modern autism is not uncontroversially substantially 
flawed, non-spectrum approaches and subtyped spectrums deserve investigation. 
Donvan & Zucker's book is less problematic because the limited scope of their claims also 
limits the consequences of their historical errors. Lacking the large narrative of Neurotribes and its 
striking comparison between modern approaches and earlier approaches, In a Different Key largely 
manages to avoid transmitting any harmful messages while containing a significant amount of easily 
readable historical material. Academic historians aware of Silberman's problematic narrative may find 
both books' novel content worth reading but for non-specialists I would recommend Donvan & 
Zucker's book. 
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